European Administrative Reform and Agencies by Ellen Vos
 
RSC 2000/51 © 2000 Ellen Vos 
 












RSC No. 2000/51 
 
 

























EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE  
RSC 2000/51 © 2000 Ellen Vos 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form  





























© 2000 Ellen Vos  
Printed in Italy in November 2000 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI) 
Italy  
RSC 2000/51 © 2000 Ellen Vos 
In the debate on the reform of the European Commission particular attention is 
given to agencies set up within the Community’s institutional structure. Agencies 
are considered to be important as they could carry out specific administrative 
functions, thus enabling the Commission to concentrate on policy-making. In 
various documents on the reform of the Commission, functional decentralisation 
to agencies appears indeed to be very attractive to the Commission itself too. 
This paper aims to examine how EU agencies could be of significance in the 
process of reform of the Commission.
* It discusses advantages and 
disadvantages of agencies. Hereby it particularly focuses on the legality and 
legitimacy concerns expressed in relation to agencies and investigates problems 
relating to the institutional balance, transparency, accountability, language regimes 
and technocracy.  
 
 
1. Problematic EU Administration  
 
Over the years, it has become apparent that the internal market is not achieved 
and maintained without the creation of a coherent body of administrative rules. 
The deepening of Community activities in various areas sees particularly to the 
implementation of Community rules and the corresponding design and 
approximation of administrative rules, and the management of the existing 
regulatory framework. The spillover effect of market integration, for instance, has 
involved the Community into developing an active policy on product safety 
regulation and the management of risks. ‘Post-Maastricht’, greater Community 
activity in various areas entails therefore a f undamental shift of powers from 
national to Community level. For reasons of efficiency and the need to reduce the 
workload of the Community legislature, this has in turn led to delegation of 
greater (implementing) powers to the Commission. The growing Community and 
Commission activities in this third phase of integration have however generally 
been received with great scepticism. In the ‘post-1992’ era, public alertness to 
Community and particularly Commission activities has grown, fuelled by the 
growing significance of the Community and its achievements during the 1980s. 
As a result increasing attention is paid to the legitimacy and accountability of 
Community activity and the Community’s ‘democratic deficit’. The Maastricht 
and Amsterdam treaties and secondary legislation have attempted to remedy 
these issues, in particular by enhancing the role of the Parliament in the EU’s 
legislative process. Democratic representation at the formal legislative stage of the 
policy process is however inadequate where the e arlier and later stages of the 
decision-making process are increasingly recognised as determinant for the final 
                                                                 
* I am very grateful to Prof. Yves Mény, Renaud Dehousse and Bruno de Witte for their valuable 
comments. I alone am responsible for any shortcomings.  
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outcomes (also N. Lebessis / J. Paterson 1999). Therefore legitimacy and 
accountability concerns cannot be remedied by focussing on the powers of the 
Parliament alone, as increasing Community activities generally lead to enhanced 
decision-making by the Commission which is delegated broad discretionary 
powers. The exercise of broad discretionary powers by the Commission results 
in turn in a loosening of the relationship with the Community legislature and 
herewith its claims as source of legitimation. In this way, it is no longer sufficient 
to holding the Community to the yardstick of the system of representative 
parliamentary democracy (e.g. D. Curtin 1999),
1 but is it necessary to consider 
models based on participation to enhance legitimacy of EU governance.
2 These 
developments all emphasise the need to look for additional means of 
administrative legitimacy, such as greater democratic and judicial c ontrol, 
increased transparency, greater expertise and stronger participation of civil 
society in the decision-making process, open hearings and public debate. 
 
The search for such means has gained in importance against the background 
of the recent episodes surrounding the Commission, which put the legitimacy of 
Community activity heavily to trial. First, the outbreak of the BSE crisis in March 
of 1996 clearly demonstrated severe shortcomings in the Commission’s 
management in this area.
3 Not surprisingly, the institutional failures of the BSE 
crisis resulted in a general public distrust in Commission action. Criticism about 
the Commission’s functioning was further exacerbated by the recent corruption 
scandals regarding the Commission, which revealed both unacceptable conduct 
of certain Commissioners and serious managerial inadequacies of the 
Commission.
4 In the latter context, the Commission itself recently pointed to 
communication problems between the Commission’s directorates-general, an 
uneven distribution  of the workload, a fragmented responsibility, unexploited 
management skills and outdated systems and procedures.
5 
 
                                                                 
1 See also, the European Parliament Resolution on the democratic deficit, (1988) OJ C 187/229. 
2 See, for instance, the call for more participation of civil society by the Parliament, Report of the 
Parliament’s Institutional Committee on the participation of citizens and social players in the Union’s 
institutional system, A4-0338/96 (rapporteur Herzog).  
3 Report of the Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE, set up by the Parliament in July 1996, on 
the alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law in relation to 
BSE, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Community and the national courts of 7 February 
1997, A4-0020/97/A, PE 220.544/fin/A. See further below, section 5.3. 
4 See Committee of Independent Experts, First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, 
Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission of 15 March 1999, << 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/en/default.htm >>. 
5 CG3(2000) 1/17. Reforming the Commission. Consultative document, Communication from Mr 
Kinnock in agreement with Ms Schreyer, of 18 January 2000.  
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These episodes have made plain that decision-making by the Commission 
(and more generally, the Community) too frequently still is ambiguous a nd 
obscure, is little effective and efficient and is far away from public perception, 
whilst the possibility for civil society to participate in the decision-making 
remains problematic (Lebessis/Paterson 1999). These events, together with the 
increasing functions which the Commission needs to carry out, for which it was 
not designed originally and which reveal its limits in relation to capacity and 
supply of expertise and information, have inevitably amplified legitimacy 




2. The Promise of Reform 
 
Put under strong pressure, the Commission’s new President, Mr. Prodi, 
expressed on several occasions his commitment to reform and promised to 
‘transform the Commission into a  modern, efficient administration’ (Prodi 
1999c), ‘to face new challenges in the 21
st century’ (Prodi 1999d). The 
importance of internal reform of the Commission and of the European civil 
service was once more emphasised by the Cologne European Council which 
highly ranked the institutional reform on its agenda
6 and encouraged Mr Prodi to 
proceed with his reform proposals (Prodi 1999b). In line with the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the latter clearly visioned a more political role of the Commission and 
assured ‘greater efficiency, absolute transparency and full accountability’ (Prodi 
1999a), all of which form the basis of the Commission’s agenda for 
administrative reform.
7 In this context, new modes of EU governance gain in 
importance, in particular reliance on independent agencies. Agencies could, for 
instance, relieve the Commission from specific administrative tasks, which would 
leave the Commission greater room to concentrate on the giving of more political 
direction. In its Strategic Option Paper of October 1999, the Commission indeed 
considered the adoption of, what it calls, ‘an externalisation policy’, by means of 
which responsibilities would be devolved to public service bodies (being either 
existing agencies and new bodies or national/transnational public bodies) 
(‘devolution’) or to private sector entities (‘outsourcing’),
8 as was already 
recommended by the Committee of Independent Experts.
9 This strategy of 
                                                                 
6 In particular in relation to the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting votes in the 
Council and the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council. 
7 Administrative Reform of the European Commission: Statement of Purpose and Structure, 
CG3(1999) 1/4. 
8 G3(1999) 10/6. 
9 See the Committee of Independent Experts in its Second Report on ‘Reform of the Commission, 
Analysis of current practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud’ of  
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delegation by the Commission of all or part of its tasks or activities as a means to 
implement its strategy to re-centre the Commission on its core-tasks and policy 
priorities is confirmed in the March 2000 White Paper ‘Reforming the 
Commission’.
10 For the purpose of this paper we shall therefore discuss what 
role EU agencies could play in the process of reform. 
 
 
3. Functional Decentralisation and EU Agencies 
 
Ever since the Community began to function the Community institutions have 
used some kind of functional decentralisation by seeking the assistance of 
various bodies in the carrying out of specific Community activities, foremost 
committees and agencies. Committees have generally been created in response to 
the need to achieve effective and efficient Community decision-making, to 
guarantee a sound scientific basis, to ensure the continuing presence of the 
Member States within the Community decision-making process
11 and to include 
the views of socio-economic parties. Accordingly, committees have been 
entrusted with particular functions: ranging from the collection and assessment of 
technical and scientific data and the giving of scientific advice, informing the 
Commission of the opinions of the various interests involved, and the ensurance 
of political approval of the Member States in the implementing phase (see 
Joerges & Vos (eds.) 1999 and Joerges & Falke 2000). Agencies have generally 
been created in response to the increased requirement for information and co-
ordination at the Community level as well as by the need to lighten the 
Commission’s workload in various policy areas. These agencies, which are sited 
all over the Community
12 and often based on existing committees, support the 
Community institutions and national authorities in identifying, preparing and 
evaluating specific policy measures and guidelines (see in general Everson 1995) 





16 drugs and drug addiction,
17 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
10-9-1999, (recommendation 15 and section 2.3 of the Report), << 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/en/default.htm >>. 
10 COM (2000) 200. 
11 See Council Decision 1999/468/EC on comitology, (1999) OJ L 184/23. 
12 After a heated political struggle, political agreement on the seat of these bodies was finally reached 
in 1993, see (1993) OJ C 323/1. 
13 Council Regulation 337/75, (1975) OJ L 39/1. 
14 Council Regulation 1365/75, (1975) OJ L 139/1. 
15 Council Regulation (EEC) 1210/90, (1990) OJ L 120/1. 
16 Council Regulation (EEC) 1360/90, (1990) OJ L 131/1, amended by Council Regulation (EC) 
2063/94, (1994) OJ L 216/9. 
17 Council Regulation (EEC) 302/93, (1993) OJ L 36/1.  
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pharmaceuticals,
18 trade marks, designs and models,
19 safety and health at 
work,
20 plant variety,
21 and racism and xenophobia.
22 Very recently, a special 
agency was created which has specific powers to assist in the reconstruction 
programmes for Kosovo.
23 The setting up of agencies for human rights and 
democracy,
24 food safety
25 and aviation safety
26 is currently under consideration.  
 
Without specifying a precise institutional frame, the Commission recently 
confirmed the importance of delegation and decentralisation of day-to-day 
executive tasks, whilst highlighting the need of an open government and 
accountability, to be build on new forms of partnerships between the different 
levels of European governance.
27 This view largely coincides with the plea made 
by Dehousse and Majone for more decentralisation and delegation of 
implementing powers. In view of the increasing politicisation of the European 
integration process and the lack of both competences and resources of the 
Commission to adopt measures to ensure uniform implementation of EU 
policies, the latter specifically called for a greater role of autonomous agencies. In 
their opinion the Commission’s tasks should be divided into policy-making and 
technical/administrative functions (Dehousse & Majone 1999; Mény 1999). The 
Commission should so primarily act as an ‘ administration de mission’ and 
identify the areas in which action by the Community is necessary and would not 
be entangled in the daily management of EU policies; agencies, bringing together 
technical and economic expertise should deal with the latter (Majone 1996).  
 
In general, decentralising government to independent agencies is indeed 
considered advantageous in that they facilitate the use of scientific and/or 
technical experts who are not part of the normal bureaucratic structure, offer 
                                                                 
18 Council Regulation (EEC) 2309/93, (1993) OJ L 214/1. 
19 Council Regulation (EC) 40/94, (1994) OJ L 11/1.  
20 Council Regulation (EC) 2062/94, (1994) OJ L 216/1. 
21 Council Regulation (EC) 2100/94, (1994) OJ L 227/1. 
22 Council Regulation (EC) 1035/97, (1997) OJ L 151/1. A Translation Centre was created to meet 
the translation needs of these bodies, Council Regulation (EC) 2965/94, (1994) OJ L 314/1, as 
amended by Council Regulation (EC) 2610/95, (1995) OJ L 268/1. 
23 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2454/1999, (1999) OJ L 299/1. 
24 As proposed by the Cologne European Council of June 1999 (point 46 of the Presidency 
conclusions). 
25 As proposed by the Commission in its White Paper on Food Safety, COM(1999) 719 final. See 
below section 5.3. 
26 See Commission working document - In view of the discussions within the Council on the creation 
of the European aviation safety authority in the Community framework, COM(2000) 144 final  
27 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, ‘Strategic Objectives 2000-2005, “Shaping the 
New Europe”, COM(2000) 154 final.  
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greater staffing flexibility, reduce the workload of the administration so as to 
enable it to concentrate on strategic policy, insulate the resolution of technical 
regulatory issues from the day-to-day political change and contribute to greater 
transparency and accountability (see Baldwin & McCrudden 1987: 4-7; Baldwin 
1995; Craig 1999: 45-50). The very fact that a clearly identifiable agency, instead 
of an obscure Commission division or an equally opaque committee, would 
carry out clearly defined tasks should so, in principle, create greater 
transparency. Importantly, agencies are also a rgued to provide greater 
consistency in implementing policies because they operate at arm’s length from 
the political institutions; being ‘non-majoritarian’ they are not part of the political 
game (Dehousse & Majone 1999). In this respect, agencies would c ertainly 
respond to the desire to intensify the Commission’s political profile, and add to 
the credibility of the achievement of regulatory goals. Decentralisation to clearly 
identifiable agencies could furthermore be advantageous in that they could 
encourage uniform interpretation and implementation of Community law where 
they form the nucleus in networks of national authorities (Dehousse 1997), and 
further administrative integration (Kreher 1997: 238), whilst they could play an 
important role in the international arena too. The creation of agency networks 
involving all interested parties could in principle also contribute to ‘a Europe 
closer to the citizen’ and foster a better understanding and public confidence in 
EU action.  
 
Leaving governmental tasks t o be carried out by independent agencies, 
however, has encountered also strong critiques that point in particular to 
concerns of agencies’ legitimacy and legality. In general, legitimacy concerns are 
forwarded in relation to the place of agencies as a fourth branch of government 
within the system of separation of powers and to the carrying out of tasks by 
agencies which do not have a constitutional basis and would not be subject to the 
constitutional guarantees. In the non-majoritarian (American) agency model, 
independent agencies generally perform both legislative and executive tasks and 
to some extent carry out a judicial function (Majone 1996). As a result, they have 
been accused of concentrating too much power in the same authority. Closely 
linked herewith are legality concerns which generally relate to the delegation of 
decision-making powers to agencies and the worry about the legal basis for this. 
In addition, delegation of greater decisional powers to agencies gives rise to fears 
they are easily influenced and subverted to the ends of those whom they are 
supposed to regulate (e.g. Baldwin & McCrudden: 9-10; Majone 1996). Equally 
the independence of agencies has argued to be not well enough inserted in the 
system of public scrutiny (Everson 1995: 181). For instance, resort to agencies 
could arguably lead to more fragmentation and in turn erosion of accountability 
as sheer institutional complexity would conceal which institution is accountable 
for a specific issue (Rhodes 1996). Furthermore, agencies’ transparency and  
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accountability are regarded rather doubtful, pointing in particular to the 
problematic disentanglement of expert findings from political strategies (Shapiro 
1997), whilst their languages regimes may interfere with citizen’s rights. Below it 
will be examined if and how these concerns can be remedied.  
 
 
4. EU Agencies, Delegation of Powers and Institutional Balance 
 
4.1. The Existing EU Agencies  
 
At present, the existing agencies do not (yet) have autonomous regulatory 
functions. Many of them  are based on (scientific) committees and provide an 
administrative frame in which these committees operate. Following a functional 
approach, these agencies can broadly be classified into: 1) agencies which have 
as their main function to provide information and are generally charged with the 
co-ordination and supervision of this information and the creation of networks; 
2) agencies which need to provide specific services and specific measures to 
implement Community regimes and 3) agencies which provide specific 
information, expertise and services, and are the compulsory basis for decision-
making but do not have decision-making powers of their own (Kreher 1997: 236-
238). 
 
The first category of agencies can be subdivided into two sub-categories. 
The first sub-category needs to collect, analyse and disseminate information 
relating to their specific policy areas. This group comprises the European Centre 
for the Development of Vocational Training and the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (the two ‘older’ agencies) and 
the European Training Foundation. The second sub-category of agencies are 
those agencies which, in addition to the general information function, need to 
create and co-ordinate networks of experts. These networks comprise National 
Focal or Reference Points which need to co-operate with the agencies and co-
ordinate at national level the activities in relation to the agencies’ work 
programmes. They offer Member States greater influence than they would have 
otherwise h ad under an alternative approach of centralised information and 
planning within the Commission (Ladeur 1996). The agencies charged with these 
tasks are the European Environment Agency (EEA), the European Agency for 
Safety and Health at Work and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction.  
 
The second category of agencies includes the Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (trademarks and designs) (OHIM) and the Community Plant 
Variety Office. These agencies sees to the provision of services and the  
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implementation of the newly created Community regimes on trade marks and 
plant variety rights through specific registration procedures and are empowered 
to take decisions on the registration of applications for a Community trademark 
or plant variety right. 
 
The third category is a mixture between the first and the second category. 
The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) is an 
example hereof. Although formally providing solely information and specific 
expertise, this Agency bears a strong resemblance with the second category in 
that it has been allotted a specific role in the new Community authorisation 
system of pharmaceuticals but does not have formal decision-making powers. 
 
 
4.2. EU Agencies, Legal Basis and Decision-making Powers 
 
The Treaty does not provide for a specific legal basis for the creation of 
agencies. However, the creation of new agencies by the Community is generally 
not troublesome (Lauwaars 1979). Virtually all the existing agencies have been 
based on the general Treaty clause of Article 308. The only exception hereto is 
the Environment Agency, having been founded on Article 175 EC. There are 
however two important limits to the scope of Article 308 EC: first, Article 308 
EC cannot be used to change the institutional structure of the Community and 
alter its balance of powers; and secondly, Article 308 EC may not be applied if 
other Treaty provisions are available. The former limit is of particular importance 
in relation to the powers to be conferred upon agencies. It sees to the nature of 
powers delegated to agencies and determines that agency powers must not 
encroach upon those of the Treaty institutions (see below). The second limit 
refers to the generally residual character of Article 308 EC. In this context 
particular account should be taken of the general harmonisation provision, Article 
95 EC.
28 This Article, the use of which is favoured in particular by the Parliament 
to  the use of Article 308 EC for reasons of parliamentary participation 
(Brinkhorst 1996: 81), requires that measures be adopted for the ‘approximation’ 
of national provisions. Measures other than harmonisation measures may not be 
based on Article 95 EC, notwithstanding their close connection to the 
achievement and functioning of the internal market (Pipkorn 1991: 2844). Article 
95 EC could therefore be a valid legal basis only where it can be shown that the 
creation of a Community system or agency might be considered to be a 
harmonisation measure, necessary for the completion of t he internal market 
                                                                 
28 Article 95 EC has been regularly discussed by the Commission as a valid legal basis for the 
creation of agencies. The Commission, for example, initially proposed Article 95 EC as the legal 
basis for the EMEA, which was however rejected by the Council.  
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(Pipkorn 1992: 114). Hereby, harmonisation requires the changing and 
supplementing of national legislation. This means that Community measures of a 
mere institutional character do not constitute harmonisation measures in the sense 
of Article 95 EC. The creation of an agency as such by virtue of Article 95 EC 
thus seems to be excluded. However, where this is secondary to the main 
purpose of a specific measure, i.e. harmonisation, Article 95 EC may still offer a 
valid legal basis for an agency. The question as to whether an agency might be 
based on Article 95 EC must therefore be examined in the light of the ‘centre of 
gravity’ of the proposed measure (Barents 1993): does it seek to eliminate 
existing or future differences between national l egislative provisions, and is the 
agency dependent upon such harmonisation measures (Pipkorn 1991: 2847). The 
choice of the legal basis for these agencies, particularly between Articles 308 and 
95, depends, in the final analysis, upon the nature of the powers delegated to 
these bodies. 
 
The question thus arises whether regulatory powers can be delegated to 
independent agencies. The transferral of only very limited and circumscribed 
powers to the existing agencies is not without accident but stems from the case-
law of the Court of Justice, in particular its  Meroni case-law. In the  Meroni 
cases, the Court rejected the transfer of sovereign powers to subordinate 
authorities outside of the EC institutions and ruled that only ‘clearly defined 
executive powers’ could be delegated, the use of which must always remain 
subject to the supervision of the Commission. The Court justified its reasoning 
by referring to the balance of powers, ‘which is characteristic of the institutional 
structure of the Community’, and which would be distorted if discretionary 
powers were delegated to bodies other than those established by the Treaty.
29 
The underlying concern of this distinction between ‘clearly defined executive 
powers’ and ‘discretionary powers and the prohibition to delegate the latter to 
‘outside structures’ seems to lie in its understanding of democratic legitimacy in 
which the powers of any rule-making body eventually should be traced back to 
the authority of a democratically elected parliament (Joerges, Schepel & Vos 
1999). However, as I indicated earlier, the requirements of the modern welfare 
state have inexorably led to a general withdrawal of the legislature in favour of the 
administration and to non-governmental actors. Many ‘discretionary’ powers are 
at present generally delegated to the administration. This wide degree of 
discretion may accordingly be argued to have weakened the administration’s 
claim to be acting solely on the basis of the legislature’s duly enacted laws and, 
thus, to have undermined administrative legitimacy. The move away from this 
                                                                 
29 Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche S.p.A. v High Authority [1957-58] ECR 
133 and Case 10/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche S.p.A. v High Authority [1957-58] 
ECR 157.  
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‘transmission belt’ model of administrative law (Stewart 1975),
30 therefore, 
underlines the importance of searching for additional means to enhance 
administrative legitimacy (see also Everson 1998). Modern administrative law is 
therefore more concerned with procedural requirements of decision-making 
processes (such as greater democratic and judicial control, increased 
transparency, greater expertise and stronger participation of civil society), than 
with the hierarchical legitimation of rules. 
 
Doubts may therefore be expressed whether the Meroni rulings should still be 
strictly applied to the Community’s current system of checks and balances. 
Arguably, the institutional balance of powers principle which underlies the 
Community’s constitutional structure will not be upset as long as the shift of 
powers is accompanied by a reinforcement or re-balancing of the existing 
institutions and constitutional guarantees for decision-making are safeguarded. 
Recent developments seem moreover to indicate that the Court would be 
prepared to loosen the strict  Meroni requirements, in particular in relation to 
judicial review.
31 So, although not being formally competent according to the 
Treaty, in 1995 the Court of First Instance (CFI) explicitly accepted competence 
for the decisions of the OHIM and changed its Rules of Procedure to this end.
32 
In view of the expected workload especially stemming from litigation on these 
decisions, the Council has additionally allowed the CFI to give judgment by a 
single judge.
33 Hence, recently, the CFI annulled a decision of the OHIM in 
which it had refused to examine specific arguments submitted by the applicants 
in the appeal procedure, placing on the OHIM the duty to take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment.
34 
 
Therefore, under the current Treaty provisions, agencies could be delegated 
discretionary powers provided that this is accompanied by a reinforcement or re-
balancing of the existing institutions.  Hereby, the insertion of controlling 
mechanisms in relation to the agencies is of great importance (see also section 5). 
                                                                 
30 This applies also the European Community. 
31 In  Les Verts, the Court had already elucidated, the Community is based on the Rule of Law, 
permitting the Court to review the legality of all acts adopted by the institutions, Case 294/83, Parti 
Écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, at 1365. From this reasoning, 
it has been deduced that no decisional act, including those emanating from bodies other than 
institutions, might escape judicial review, any Community act whatsoever being subject to the 
Community Rule of Law; and could be applied mutatis mutandis to agency decisions, even though 
agencies do not qualify as ‘institutions’. See K. Lenaerts 1993: 46.  
32 (1995) OJ L 172/3. See Articles 130 – 136 of the CFI’s Rules of Procedure as lastly amended 
(1999) OJ L 135/92. 
33 Council Decision 1999/291/EC, ECSC, Euratom, (1999) OJ L 114/52. 
34 Case T-163/98, Procter and Gamble v OHIM, Judgment of 8 July 1999, nyr.  
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The attitudes of both the CFI and the Council allowing the CFI to exercise direct 
judicial control over the OHIM give expression hereto.
35 For reasons of legal 
certainty and coherency, a legal basis for the creation of agencies and the 
delegation of authority should nonetheless be introduced in the Treaty. Regarding 
the fears that greater decisional independence for agencies would lead to agency 
capture, it should be remarked that the problem of capture is a general problem 
for all regulators and there is little reason to assume why agencies would be more 
vulnerable to capture than the Commission would be.
36 This is clearly illustrated 
by the BSE crisis. The problem of capture could, for example, be addressed by 
(network) mechanisms ensuring transparency, political supervision and 
deliberative interaction with civil society rather than by preventing agencies from 
becoming more ‘independent’.  
 
 
5. EU Agencies and Other Legitimacy Concerns 
 
5.1. EU Agencies, Transparency and Accountability 
 
In principle clearly identifiable agencies promote transparency which in turn 
fosters accountability. Of particular importance hereby is certainly the right of 
access to information. In this context it should be noted however that the new 
right of access to documents as introduced in Article 255 EC by the Amsterdam 
Treaty is limited to the documents of three institutions: the Council, the 
Commission and the Parliament and hence does not seem to cover documents of 
the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors, the other organs provided for in 
the Treaty itself such as the Committee of Regions and the heap of other bodies 
and agencies set up under secondary Community legislation. Scrutiny of the 
regulations governing the existing agencies and their actual operation reveals 
however that the Community has subjected also the agencies to specific rules on 
transparency and accountability. Encouraged by the Code of Conduct on 
Access to Documents adopted by the Council and the Commission and the 
recommendation of the European Ombudsman that agencies, too, should adopt 
rules on access to documents,
37 most agencies have adopted decisions on 
                                                                 
35 The importance of controlling mechanisms was emphasised by the Court in  Reiff concerning 
competition law as well. Case C-185/91 Bundesanstalt für den Güterfernverkehr v Gebrüder 
Reiff [1993] ECR I-5801. 
36 It is, for instance, true that, at present, the pharmaceutical industry’s attention is increasingly 
focused on the EMEA and that there is a certain risk of the EMEA being captured. See for empirical 
research on the views of the pharmaceutical industry on the EU Licensing procedures and the 
EMEA, Vos & Hagemeister, 2000. 
37 Special Report from the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following its own-
initiative inquiry into public access to documents, (1998) OJ C 44/9.  
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access to their documents.
38 These decisions are all based on the Commission’s 
rules on access to documents. However, since access to documents of the 
Commission and the other institutions consists ‘of a long and obscure list of 
possible reasons to deny access to documents’
39 revision would be necessary so 
as to truly guarantee the public the widest possible access to documents and 
information in general.
40 Here it should be acknowledged that as a matter of 
general principle (and not merely of practice and self-regulation) the agencies too 
(as well as the other institutions and bodies not mentioned in Article 255 EC) 
should be covered by the general obligation to provide extensive access to their 
documents. Awaiting Treaty amendment, specific rules on these issues could be 
adopted by the Council under its general powers of Article 308 EC (Curtin 2000: 
27-28).  
 
In addition, in creating greater openness and giving herewith expression to the 
general principle of transparency, which is explicitly laid down in Article 1 EU by 
the Amsterdam Treaty, some agencies ( in particular, the EMEA, t he EEA, the 
OHIM and the Drug Monitoring Centre)  make extensive use of the  Internet. 
EMEA’s Internetsite, for instance, is impressive for the amount of detailed 
information, including  inter alia, its annual activity reports, its Management 
Board (press releases), its committees (calendar of meetings, press releases), and 
the addresses of the national authorities competent in the authorisation of 
medicines, standard operational procedures, guidelines and, to some anxiety of 
the pharmaceutical industry, detailed European public assessment reports.
41  
 
Transparency is equally significant for the accountability of agencies. It is 
clear that the more active agencies will become, the more important becomes the 
design of mechanisms to keep agencies under control and make them 
accountable.  In general the agencies’ independent administrative structure 
                                                                 
38 See Decision on public access to European Environment Agency documents, (1997) OJ C 282/5; 
Rules on public access to documents adopted by the Bank’s Management Committee, (1997) C 
243/13; Decision of the Governing Board on Public Access to European Training Foundation 
Documents, (1997) OJ C 369/10; Decision of the Committee of the Regions concerning public 
access to documents of the Committee of the Regions, (1997) OJ L 351/70; Rules for access to 
Translation Centre documents, (1998) OJ C 46/5; Decision 9/97 concerning public access to 
administrative documents of the European Monetary Institute, (1998) OJ L 90/43.  
39 Ombudsman J. Söderman, calling for a fundamental right to an open accountable and service-
minded administration, Press release 3/2000 of 2 February 2000.  
40 See recently, the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 
COM(2000) 30 final. This proposal however still is limited to access to documents (and not 
information in general) and provides for broad exceptions. 
41 See << http://www.eudra.org >> (home page).  
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facilitates their control. Because of their visibility, agencies may attract greater 
attention and feed the policy debate in their field. Their actions are likely to be 
identified with Community action and as such they will be held responsible 
(Dehousse 1997: 258). In this respect it is above all important that the Member 
States, the Commission and the Parliament, through their representatives on the 
Management or Administrative Boards, can control the agencies’ activities. 
Management or Administrative Boards are in fact the steering bodies of the 
agencies and generally are responsible for budgetary matters, the appointment of 
the executive directors and the monitoring of the agencies’ performance. Further 
control can be exercised on the basis of the annual activity reports of the 
agencies. In addition to these instruments of control, the Parliament has 
significant power as regards the budget of most of the agencies. The importance 
of this instrument cannot be underestimated as many agencies depend partly or 
entirely for their revenues on Community subsidies. Being non-compulsory 
expenditure, these subsidies are finally determined by the Parliament, which can 
use its powers, in a certain sense, to ‘re-orient the budget’ (Brinkhorst 1996: 77). 
Parliament’s readiness to invoke this power ‘in the name of transparency and 
accountability’ has been underlined several times (Brinkhorst 1996). This 
supervisory power would be lost when agencies become completely financially 
independent. The Commission has therefore indicated its desire to control the 
agencies’ expenditure by subjecting them to the supervision of the Commission’s 
financial controller, which would, in the view of the Commission, ensure a 
maximum of transparency and harmonisation between the agencies, whilst any 
surplus of revenues by agencies would be deposited in the general Community 
budget.
42 These proposals have not been received with great enthusiasm by he 
agencies. For example, the OHIM has strongly opposed against in particular the 
proposed deposition of revenue surplus in the general Community budget. This 
strong resistance can be explained by the fact that the OHIM obtains great part 
of its revenues from the fees paid by undertakings in return for filing and 
registering their trademarks with the Office and that it anxiously aspires complete 
financial independence.  
 
Accountability of agencies and legitimacy of agency regulation can also be 
fostered through their inclusion in networks. All the existing agencies have so 
created networks by means of which they  structure their relationship with the 
‘external world’, with their ‘stakeholders’. Through these networks, the agencies 
build on the work of the existing institutions and collaborate with them. These 
networks often promote the interaction with both governmental actors and all 
other actors concerned in a specific policy area, although the practical operation 
                                                                 
42 See amended proposals for Council regulations (EC) amending the basic regulations of certain 
decentralised community agencies, (1998) OJ C 194/5.  
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of these networks and their legitimacy as European governance structures still 
needs to be scrutinised.
43 A first step towards the institutional opening up of 
agencies to interested parties has been made by the EMEA which recently 
embraced within its organisational structure a Committee on Orphan Medicinal 
Drugs which includes also representatives of interested parties.
44 
 
Important instruments of control are further in the hands of the Court of 
Auditors, which examines the revenue of bodies established by the Community
45 
and the European Ombudsman, who guards against instances of 
maladminstration of the agencies. For example, the influence and control of the 
European Ombudsman on the behaviour of the agencies is visible where on his 
recommendation some agencies have adopted their own codes of conduct. The 
EMEA, for instance, has committed itself to respect the principles laid down in 
its code, such as equality, proportionality, no abuse of powers, impartiality, 
independence and objectivity, whilst providing guidance on situations of conflicts 
of interests (which have to be declared in advance), confidentiality and discretion 
as well as on invitations and gifts.
46 Clearly, the new European Anti-Fraud Office, 
OLAF, may exercise its investigative powers to combat fraud or corruption in 
relation to agencies too. The role which the Court of First Instance currently 
plays in reviewing the legality of the agencies’ decisions has already been alluded 
to above.  
 
 
5.2. EU Agencies and Languages 
 
From the perspective of legitimacy, the language regimes adopted by agencies 
are a thorny issue.
47 Considerations of efficiency have generally led to a 
reduction in the use of the number of languages by the agencies. This however 
severely touches upon the right of citizens to express themselves in one of the 
official languages of the Community at their choice in their contacts with the 
                                                                 
43 Within the framework of the Robert Schuman Centre Project on EU Agency Networks empirical 
research will be carried out in relation to the operation of four agency networks (of the EEA, the 
Drugs Monitoring Centre, the EMEA and the OHIM). 
44 Regulation 141/2000 of the EP and Council on orphan medicinal products, (2000) OJ L 18/1. 
45 See, for example, its Report on the financial statements of the European Agency for the Evaluation 
of Medicinal Products (EMEA, London) (Financial Year 1996), together with the Agency’s replies, 
(1997) OJ C 393/18.  
46 The E MEA Code of Conduct of 3 December 1999, published on its Internet site, << 
http://www.eudra.org/emea.html >>. 
47 I am very grateful to Bruno de Witte for pointing me to this issue.   
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Community institutions.
48 This right is explicitly laid down in Article 21 (3) EC, 
recently introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, which stipulates that: 
 
‘Every citizen of the Union may write to any of the institutions or bodies referred to in this 
Article or in Article 7 in one of the languages mentioned in Article 314 and have an answer in 
the same language’. 
 
  The language regimes operated by the agencies have indeed been criticised. 
Complaints have, for instance, arisen about the fact that the publications of the 
EEA are available mainly in English, although this agency was set up to facilitate 
the provision of information on the environment and to ensure that this 
information was publicly available.
49 Likewise, the reduction in the number of 
languages in which the vocational training magazine of the European Centre for 
the Development of Vocational Training is published has been questioned.
50 The 
language regime of the OHIM has been opposed more fiercely by a Dutch 
trademark agent who brought this issue before the CFI.
51 In this context, it is 
noted that Council Regulation 40/94 on trademarks
52 restricts the languages of 
the OHIM to five languages: English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. 
Whilst applicants for a  Community trade mark may be filed with the OHIM in 
any of the official language of the European Community, they are obliged to 
choose one of the five languages of the OHIM as their a second language. The 
OHIM may send its observations in the second language and the applicant is to 
be deemed to accept that language as a language of proceedings for opposition, 
revocation or invalidity proceedings.
53 Although the Dutch trade mark agent’s 
appeal for annulment of this language regime failed for obvious reasons of being 
not of direct and individual concern,
54 she has persisted in her objections. 
Recently, she filed a new case before the CFI, this time attacking a decision by 
OHIM’s Board of Appeal for refusing an application for registration of a trade 
mark on the ground of its choice of language (Dutch).
55  
 
  The reduction in the use of languages by the agencies may not only interfere 
                                                                 
48 See, e.g. Resolution of the European Parliament on the use of the official languages in the 
institutions of the European Union, (1995) OJ C43/91. 
49 Written Question no. 3854/97 by C. Diez de Rivera Icaza to the Commission, (1998) OJ C 
174/144. 
50 Written Question no. 3398/96 by A. Alavanos to the Commission (1997) OJ C 91/81. 
51 Case T-107/94, Kik v Council and Commission [1995] ECR II-1717. 
52 Above n. 19. 
53 Article 115 of Council Regulation 40/94, above n. 19. 
54 Which was confirmed in appeal by the ECJ: Case C-270/95 P [1996] ECR I-1987. 
55 Case T-120/99, Christina Kik v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, pending 
(1999) OJ C 246/35.  
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with citizens’ rights, it may also impinge on the right of Member States, laid 
down in Article 3 of Council Regulation no. 1 on the languages to be used by the 
Community,
56 according to which documents which are sent by a Community 
institution to a Member State need to be drafted in the language of that State. In 
this way, Member States of ‘minority’ languages may have greater difficulty in 




Clearly, in these situations the risk is incurred that through decentralisation of 
specific functions to agencies complex procedural rules as regards language 
requirements which are applicable to the Community institutions will be 
circumvented and that the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment of 
languages is eroded. The balancing between efficiency and legitimacy of the 
language regimes of agencies needs therefore careful reconsideration in the light 




5.3. EU Agencies, Information, Technocracy and Politics 
 
More problematic is the functioning of agencies in the ‘grey zone’ between 
‘pure’ administration and politics. Arguments to uphold agencies’ legitimacy are 
based on the thesis that agencies could develop indirect information-based 
modes of regulation which are more in line with current economic, technological 
and political conditions than the coercive instruments of command and control 
which have been used in many Community policies (Dehousse & Majone 1999). 
Yet, in many cases, it is difficult to determine where the carrying out of mere 
managerial, technical and information gathering tasks stops and policy-making 
begins. For instance, the significance of the information produced by agencies is 
evident as it forms the basis of regulatory decision-making within the 
Community. The provision of information and evidence by agencies clearly 
influences decision-making and could be considered as a kind of ‘regulation by 
information’ (Majone 1997). In this way, ‘contemporary politics is a politics of 
information’ (Shapiro 1997: 285).  
 
                                                                 
56 Special Edition (1952-1958) OJ 59. 
57 See e.g. in relation to the language used by documents in committee procedures the complaint by 
Germany, Case C-263/95, Germany v Commission [1998] ECR I-441, para. 27. In practice, it 
occurs that representatives of Member States of a less frequently used language express their 
dissatisfaction as regards the impossibility to use their own language in meetings of the agencies’ 
management boards. 
58 See on language rights and European integration in general, De Witte 1992.  
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Health and safety regulation and environmental regulation can be considered 
as such ‘arenas in which scientific and technological information battles are 
central to political outcomes’ (Shapiro 1997: 285). This is evidently 
demonstrated by the BSE episode which rightly put public confidence in the 
Commission’s handling of BSE into severe crisis. The Temporary Committee of 
Inquiry into BSE, set up by the Parliament in July 1996,
59 revealed that during 
1990-1994 when the disease had reached crisis levels, the Commission had 
followed a true policy of ‘disinformation’.
60 The latter policy had not been 
confined to misleading public opinion, but had played a major role in relations 
both between the Community institutions themselves (legislative activity on BSE 
by the Community had been suspended and no debates on BSE were held in the 
Council) and with the Member States (the then Commissioner on Agriculture, 
MacSharry, had prevented both France and Germany who wanted in 1990 to 
restrict the import of British beef from doing so by threatening them with Court 
proceedings). The Committee moreover observed that the Commission had been 
very much influenced by the ‘British thinking’ which had been increased by the 
presence of many persons of British nationality on the two committees operating 
in this field: the Scientific Veterinary Committee (composed of scientists with a 
high-standing reputation) and the Standing Veterinary Committee (composed of 
national representatives). In addition, the operation of the Standing Veterinary 
Committee during this period had been put under political pressure, whilst also 
the information diffused by the Scientific Veterinary Committee had not been free 
from political influence either.
61 It was clear that this reconstruction and evidence 
of the regulatory policy of the Commission necessitated a change in the 
Community’s approach to risk regulation. The Inquiry Committee accordingly 
emphasised the need for greater transparency as regards action on BSE, 
particularly in relation to the conditions of the functioning and work of the 
scientists on the scientific committees; foremost advocating transparency and 
reform of  the rules governing the work of these committees to ensure 
independence and appropriate funding of the scientists and the publication of 
debates and dissenting opinions.
62 
 
In response to these findings, the Commission hastily prepared a re-
organisation, putting the responsibility for its scientific committees under the 
                                                                 
59 (1996) OJ C 261/132. See also European Parliament Resolution on the Commission’s information 
policy on BSE since 1988 and the measures it has taken to ensure compliance with the export ban 
and eradicate the disease, (1996) OJ C 261/75. 
60 Report on the alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law 
in relation to BSE, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Community and the national courts of 7 
February 1997, A4-0020/97/A, PE 220.544/fin/A. 
61 Ibid., at 10. 
62 Ibid., at 38-40.  
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umbrella of DG 24, rebaptised into Health and Consumer Protection and 
introduced the principles of ‘excellence’, ‘independence’ and ‘transparency’ to 
govern the production of scientific expertise by the Community’s scientific 
committees.
63 However this has proved insufficient to restore public confidence. 
Subsequent scares of food safety (in particular concerning dioxin contamination) 
increased public awareness and even further undermined the c onfidence of 
consumers in the capacity of the food industry (in its broadest sense) and the 
public authorities to ensure that their food is safe (Byrne 1999). This, together 
with the lack of capacity of the existing committee system, which struggled with 
the increase in demands placed upon it, has led the Commission to propose the 
creation of a (long awaited for
64) European Food Authority.
65 Although the 
Commission has not yet disclosed the precise institutional design of the agency, 
its functions and the proposed network system by means of which the agency 
should be embedded in the national agencies and institutions bear strong 
resemblances with the EMEA.
66 Whilst denying the agency any regulatory 
powers, the main tasks of this new agency will consist of the giving of scientific 
advice, the gathering and analysis of information and the communication of risk. 
According to the Commission, the agency would have to demonstrate the highest 
level of independence, of scientific excellence and of transparency in its 
operations. Like the EMEA, the Food Authority would be at the centre of a 
network of scientific contacts, i.e. the national scientific agencies and institutions. 
It would not only act as a point of scientific excellence, it would also provide 
advice to consumers and give them guidance on important safety developments. 
 
The Commission insists on a strict division into risk assessment (scientific 
advice), to be carried out by the agency and risk management (policy-making), to 
be carried out by the Commission itself. However, with this the Commission 
ignores that in many situations of  scientific uncertainty and/or controversy, 
scientific analysis and management are strongly intertwined (Cranor 1993: 132; 
Rowe 1992: 23) and no ‘objective scientific facts’ exist. It is for example very 
likely that scientific evidence relating to a highly sensitive issue such as a request 
for an EU authorisation of a specific novel food will include some socio-
economic elements. In this respect, comparisons can be drawn with the EMEA. 
Opinions adopted by EMEA’s scientific committee CPMP are likely to include 
not only purely scientific, but also normative (nationally-flavoured) elements. This 
                                                                 
63 Commission Green Paper on the general principles of food law in the European Union, COM(97) 
176 final. 
64 See e.g., the discussions in  F. Snyder (ed.) 1994. The proposal for the establishment of a 
Veterinary Inspection Agency (COM (96) 223 final) was withdrawn by the Commission in 1998 
(COM(98) 32 final). 
65 White Paper on Food Safety, COM(1999) 719 final. 
66 Ibid.  
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stems particularly from EMEA’s two-tiered manner of formulating a scientific 
opinion, by means of which national experts, representing their competent 
authorities, adopt an opinion only after consultation with a pool of national 
scientific experts (Vos 1999: 228-230). Here, once EMEA’s scientific committee 
CPMP has reached a consensus on the authorisation of a specific medicinal 
product (including all relevant considerations), the Commission is likely to adhere 
to this opinion. This seems indeed to be confirmed by the authorisation practice. 
It should, therefore, be recognised that often, especially in health and safety and 
environmental regulation, it is illusionary to believe that the managerial and 
scientific tasks to be carried out by agencies do not embrace political issues. A 
strict division between mere managerial and scientific tasks by agencies and 
policy-making by the Commission is difficult to uphold. The non-majoritarian 
governance model based on independent technocratic agencies clearly fails to 
recognise the value-laden nature of health and safety and environmental 
regulation.  
 
Yet, this is not to say that there would be no need for agencies operating 
‘independently’ from the Commission. In this context, it should be observed that 
to a large extent resort to agencies stems from attempts to encounter deficiencies 
and sentiments of misgivings towards the Commission. As advantageous 
characteristics of EU agencies, and rationales for the resort to these agencies, 
remain their abilities to reduce the Commission’s workload so as to enable it to 
concentrate on policy matters of a more strategic nature, to facilitate the use of 
outside experts and the production of valuable information and scientific 
expertise and to foster greater transparency and accountability. Particularly in the 
aftermath of the BSE crisis, resort to agencies could cultivate credibility, clarity 
and public confidence and thus enhance EU legitimacy. For example, the 
European Food Authority should, according to the Commission, play an 
important role in providing information to consumers on food safety issues and 
ensure that they can make better-informed choice, herewith enhancing their 
confidence in food safety. Difficulties to distinguish information and/or scientific 
evidence from policy-making should therefore not result in a denial of the 
potential merits of agencies but rather emphasise the need to examine the 
legitimacy potential of agency networks, escaping from conventional 
governmental organisation charts (Ladeur 1996), or whether alternatively, there is 
a need to build in mechanisms putting agencies under greater political control 
(Shapiro 1997: 287). Such an analysis could serve as a basis to reconsider the 
theoretical framework in which EU agencies should operate.
67 
 
                                                                 
67 The empirical study carried out within the framework of the RSC project on Agency Networks 
aims to reveal information in this context.   
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6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The increasing need for Community action in various areas and the recent 
scandals surrounding the Commission have questioned the efficiency and 
legitimacy of Community, and in particular Commission, activities. This together 
with the complexities of the tasks to be carried out have highlighted the limits of 
continuous reliance on the C ommission and necessitated reform of the 
Commission. Agencies can play an important role in this reform as they provide 
greater consistency in implementing policies and encourage uniform interpretation 
and implementation of Community law where they form the nucleus in networks 
of national authorities and interested parties. By means of such networks, 
agencies could also foster the participation of civil society in decision-making. 
The production of information by agencies potentially leads to more informed 
and better quality of decision-making. Moreover, agencies are more visible, 
which facilitates accountability for their activities. Resort to agencies could 
relieve the Commission from specific administrative tasks, which would leave the 
Commission greater  room to concentrate on the giving of more political 
direction. It is hereby important to recognise that such technical and managerial 
administrative functions may also involve policy-making. Difficulties to 
distinguish information and/or scientific evidence from policy-making should 
however not discard the potential benefits of agencies. Rather, such difficulties 
emphasise the need to scrutinise the legitimacy potential of agency networks 
operating in isolation or under political supervision. On the basis of such an 
analysis a loose constitutional and administrative framework should be developed 
which disciplines agencies (and other bodies) operating in the Community’s 




Office for International Affairs 




RSC 2000/51 © 2000 Ellen Vos  21
References: 
 
Baldwin, R. (1995) Rules and Government, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
Baldwin, R. /C. McCrudden (1987), Regulation and Public Law, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London 
Barents, R. (1993), ‘The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the 
Legal Basis of Community Legislation’, 30 CML Rev, 85-110 
Brinkhorst, L.J. (1996),  ‘The future of European Agencies: a budgetary 
perspective from the European Parliament’, in A. Kreher (ed.),  The New 
Agencies. Conference Report, EUI Working Paper RSC 96/49, Florence, 75-
81 
Byrne (1999), Commissioner DG Health and Consumer Protection, ‘Food Safety 
in Europe’. Arthur Cox Conference on Food Law, Dublin, 5 November 
1999, DN: Speech/99/156 
Craig, P. (1999), ‘The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy and 
Legitimacy’, in: P. Craig / G. De Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 
OUP, Oxford 1999, 45-50 
Cranor,  C.F. (1993),  Regulating Toxic Substances. A Philosophy of Science 
and the Law, New York/Oxford 
Curtin, D. (1999), ‘“Civil Society” and the European Union: Opening Spaces for 
Deliberative Democracy?’, in  Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law Florence, Kluwer, London, 185-279 
Curtin, D. (2000), ‘Citizens’ Fundamental Right of Access to EU Information: an 
Evolving Digital Passepartout?’ (2000) 37 CML Rev., 7-41 
Dehousse, R. (1997), ‘Regulation by Networks in the European Community: the 
Role of European Agencies’, 4 JEPP 2, 246-261 
Dehousse, R. /G. Majone (1999), Reforming European Governance: Options 
for the New Commission, Centre Européen, Porte d’Europe, << 
http://www.portedeurope.org/documents/reforming.pdf >> 
De Witte, B. (1992), ‘Surviving in Babel? Language Rights and European 
Integration’, in: Dinstein & Tabory (eds.), The Protection of Minorities and 
Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1992, 277 – 300 
Everson, M. (1995), ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?’, 1 ELJ 2, 180-
204 
Everson, M. (1998), ‘Administering Europe?’, 36 JCMS 2, 195-216 
Joerges, C. / E. V os (eds.) (1999), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law 
and Politics, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
Joerges, C. / J. Falke (eds.) (2000) Das Ausschußwesen der Europäischen 
Union, Nomos, Baden-Baden 
Joerges, C. /H. Schepel/E. Vos (1999),  The Law’s Problems with t he 
Involvement of Non-governmental Actors in Europe’s Legislative Processes: 
the Case of Standardisation, EUI Working Paper, Law 99/9, Florence  
RSC 2000/51 © 2000 Ellen Vos  22
Kreher, A. (1997), ‘Agencies in the European Community  – a step towards 
administrative integration in Europe’, 4 JEPP 2, 225-245 
Ladeur, K.-H. (1996), The European Environment Agency and Prospects for a 
European Network of Environmental Considerations, EUI Working Paper 
RSC 96/50, Florence 
Lauwaars, R.H. (1979), ‘Auxiliary Organs and Agencies in the EEC’, 16 CML 
Rev, 365-387 
Lebessis, N. / J. Paterson (1999), Improving the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of 
EU Governance:  A Review of the Genval Workshop of 21-22 May 1999 
and a Possible Reform Agenda for the Commission, European Commission, 
Forwards Studies Unit, CdP (99) 750 
Lenaerts, K. (1993), ‘Regulating the regulatory process: ‘delegation of powers’ 
in the European Community’, (1993) 18 ELR, 23-49 
Majone, G. (1996), Regulating Europe, Routledge, London 
Majone, G. (1997), ‘The new European agencies: regulation by information’, 4 
JEPP 2, 262-275 
Mény, Y. (1999), ‘Europe: Les pilotes et la machine’, in: Le Monde, 4 September 
1999 
Pipkorn, J. (1991), ‘Artikel 100A, Angleichung von Vorschriften mit Bezug auf 
den Binnenmarkt’, in H. Von der Groeben/J. Thiesing/C.-D. Ehlermann, 
Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Band 2, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2822-2895 
Pipkorn, J. (1992), ‘Bericht Europäische Gemeinschaften’, in C. Starck (Hrsg.), 
Erledigung von Verwaltungsaufgaben durch Personalkörperschaften und 
Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 110-132 
Prodi, R. (1999c), Speech to the European Parliament of 14 September 1999, 
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/prodi/speeches/ 
designate/index_en.htm>> 
Prodi, R. (1999a), Speech to the European Parliament of 4 May 1999, 
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/prodi/speeches/ 
designate/index_en.htm>> 
Prodi, R. (1999b), Intervention to the Cologne European Council of June 1999, 
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/prodi/ 
speeches/designate/index_en.htm>> 
Prodi, R. (1999d), The European Union and the Challenge of the 21
st Century, 
21
st Forum on Financial Policy and Taxation, Karlsruhe, 12 November 1999, 
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/ prodi/index_en.htm>> 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996),  The new European Agencies. Agencies  in British 
Government: Revolution or Evolution?, EUI Working Paper RSC 96/51, 
Florence 
Rowe, W.D. (1992), ‘Risk Analysis’, in M. Waterstone (ed.), Risk and Society: 
the Interaction of Science, Technocracy and Public Policy, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 17-31  
RSC 2000/51 © 2000 Ellen Vos  23
Shapiro, M. (1997), ‘The problems of independent agencies in the United States 
and the European Union’, 4 JEPP 2, 276-291 
Snyder F., (ed.), (1994), A Regulatory Framework for Foodstuffs in the Internal 
Market, EUI Working Paper LAW 94/4, Florence 
Stewart, R . (1975),  ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’, 88 
Harvard Law Review, 1669-1813 
Vos, E. (1999),  Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and Safety 
Regulation, Committees, Agencies and Private Bodies, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford  
Vos E. / M. H agemeister (2000), ‘Views of Pharmaceutical Companies on the 
New EU Licensing Procedures’, in:  Journal of the European Society of 
Regulatory Affairs - ESRA Rapporteur, March/April, 22-27 
 
 